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Abstract
Extraterritorial application of the United States antitrust laws often has been a sticking point
between the United States and its foreign trading partners. Tensions have arisen between the
United States and other nations in this area as a result of differing competition policies, regulatory
regimes, legal systems and forms of business enterprise. The importance of this subject area,
and the global irritations it has generated for many years, suggest the development of a uniform
approach by either the United States Congress or via the United States Supreme Court. This
Article reviews the case law in this subject area, and discusses some of the efforts in other forums
to clarify the current confusion.
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INTRODUCTION
Extraterritorial application of the United States antitrust
laws often has been a sticking point between the United States
and its foreign trading partners. Foreign government protests
have been particularly vigorous when, as in Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.,' (Japanese Electronic Prod-
ucts), the allegedly unlawful conduct at issue has been man-
dated by foreign sovereigns.
Tensions have arisen between the United States and other
nations in this area as a result of differing competition policies,
regulatory regimes, legal systems and forms of business enter-
prise. 2 The United States might be characterized as a "mixed"
economy marked by expansive antitrust laws, limited govern-
ment intervention, predominantly private enterprise and a ma-
jor emphasis on private litigation. Many other nations, how-
ever, have promoted their economic development through
more centralized industrial policies; state-owned, directed or
assisted enterprises; a lesser emphasis on the primacy of com-
petition policies; and virtually no private antitrust enforce-
t This Article was prepared from a speech delivered by Mr. Victor at the
Practising Law Institute program in November, 1985.
* Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York, New York. J.D., 1963; B.B.A.,
1960, University of Michigan.
** Associate, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. J.D., 1984,
University of Pennsylvannia; B.A., 1978, Harvard University.
1. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd., 494 F. Supp. 1161
(E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part, revd and remanded in part, sub nor., In re Japanese Elec.
Prod. Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd and remanded sub noam. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
2. See Gotleib, Extraterritoriality: A Canadian Perspective, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
449 (1983); Shultz, Trade, Interdependence and Conflicts offJurisdiction, DEP'T ST. BULL.,
June 1984, at 33.
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ment.3 Not surprisingly, such divergent governmental inter-
ests and policies have frequently clashed when private plain-
tiffs have sought to apply the United States antitrust laws
extraterritorially. For example, most of our trading partners
do not sanction such broad-ranging discovery as is available in
the United States, consider private treble damages to be im-
properly "penal," and generally rely upon governmental agen-
cies, rather than private parties, to enforce their competition
policies.4
In response to what they believe to be improper assertions
of United States antitrust jurisdiction over conduct affecting
national interests, many foreign governments have retaliated
against the United States by enacting so-called "blocking" stat-
utes. These statutes restrict the extent to which U.S. private
litigants can obtain evidence or production of documents for
use in proceedings in the United States. 5 Variants of such a
statute have been enacted by Australia,6 Canada,7 France8 and
the United Kingdom,9 among others. The British legislation
also contains a "clawback" provision'0 that allows for recovery
of the non-compensatory portion of any treble damage judg-
ment paid to a prevailing American plaintiff.
The importance of this subject area, and the global irrita-
tions it has generated for many years, suggest the development
of a uniform approach by either the United States Congress or
via the United States Supreme Court. However, no such ap-
proach has yet been devised. Title IV of the Export Trading
3. E.g., Japan and Korea.
4. The competition laws of the European Economic Community and West Ger-
many, for example, do not provide for wide-ranging discovery as is permitted by U.S.
law, do not provide for treble damages, and are primarily enforced by administrative
agencies.
5. E.g., Holland (The Dutch Law ofJune 28, 1956, Concerning Economic Com-
petition, (1956) Stb. 1061, as amended, Law ofJuly 16, 1958 § 39, (1958) Stb. 413);
New Zealand (1980 N.Z. Stat. 173, No. 27); South Africa (Atomic Energy Act, 1967,
No. 90 § 30, 15 Stat. Repub. So. Afr. 1045 (1977)); Switzerland (STGB, C.P., C.P.
Art. 162 and 273).
6. Prohibition of Certain Evidence Amendment Act, 1976, No. 121, 1976 Austl.
Acts 1125, as amended by No. 202, 1976 Austl. Acts 1743.
7. Uranium Information Security Regulations, Can. Stat. 0. & Reg. 76-644 (P.S.
1976-2368, Sept. 21, 1976).
8. Act ofJuly 16, 1980, No. 80-538, 1980J.O. 1799, D.S.L. 285.
9. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 6.
10. Id.
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Company Act of 1982 has resulted in little change." Some
forty years after Judge Learned Hand's seminal decision in
United States v. Aluminum Company of America'2 (Alcoa), the law
governing extraterritorial application of the United States anti-
trust laws remains somewhat uncertain, perhaps because ofju-
dicial reluctance to engage in what the courts view as "polit-
ical" decision-making.
This Article reviews the case law in this subject area, and
discusses some of the efforts in other forums to clarify the cur-
rent confusion.
I. CASE LA W DEVELOPMENTS
In 1909, when the Sherman Act 13 was first interpreted in
an extraterritorial context, the Supreme Court, in American Ba-
nana,'4 held that it did not cover conduct occurring outside the
United States. The Supreme Court refused to take jurisdiction
over a suit in which the plaintiff, the American Banana Com-
pany, alleged that the defendant's activities in Costa Rica mo-
nopolized and restrained the Central American banana trade
with the United States, because the challenged conduct oc-
curred outside of the United States.' 5 This decision was, in
part, a reflection of the relatively limited role of the United
States in the world economy during the early twentieth cen-
tury, as well as of the narrow territorial concept of jurisdiction
then prevailing.' 6
A. The Alcoa Test
After World War II, jurisdictional thinking underwent a
revolutionary change. The United States emerged as one of
the dominant postwar economies with increasing commercial
ties around the world and the narrow American Banana limita-
11. See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
12. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982). By its terms, the Sherman Act covers -[e]very con-
tract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" and every person who
shall "monopolize... attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire ... to monop-
olize" trade or commerce "with foreign nations .... Id.
14. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
15. Id. at 354-55.
16. J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
§§ 6.02-6.06 (2d ed. 1981).
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tion on antitrust jurisdiction was abandoned in Alcoa.' 7 In Al-
coa, the United States government sought to break up Alcoa's
domestic aluminum monopoly, and also challenged activities
of Aluminum Limited, Alcoa's independent Canadian subsidi-
ary.' 8 The Alcoa court therefore had to analyze whether United
States antitrust laws reached Limited's participation in a cartel
with European aluminum producers.
Described in broadest terms, Alcoa has come to stand for
the so-called "effects test" of subject matter jurisdiction.
Judge Hand declared that it was "settled law.., that any state
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its alle-
giance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences
within its borders which the state reprehends ... ,"' and held
that the Sherman Act's subject matter jurisdiction extended to
those cases in which the extraterritorial conduct was intended
to, and did in fact, have an effect upon United States com-
merce.20 Judge Hand also held that once intent to affect
United States commerce was shown, the burden of proof
should be shifted to the defendant; in other words, a showing
of intended effects constituted a prima facie showing of actual
effects. 2 1
The Alcoa approach has been applied in varying formula-
tions and to varying degrees in a number of subsequent
cases. 22 Some of the cases after Alcoa seem to omit intent alto-
gether as in, for example, Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American Presi-
dent Lines, Ltd. ,23 in which an American shipping company al-
leged that one Phillipine and five Japanese shipping companies
conspired to monopolize the Hong Kong-United States andJa-
pan-United States shipping trade. The district court refused to
17. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 416.
18. See generally id.
19. Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 443-44.
21. Id. at 444.
22. Formulations have included: (i) "anticompetitive effects on the United
States," Waldbaum v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. 926, 929 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); (ii) "impact upon United States commerce," Industria Siciliana Asfalti, S.p.A.
v. Exxon Research and Engineering Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,256, at
70,784 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); and (iii) "direc[t]" effect on "the flow of foreign commerce
into or out of this country ...." Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc..
383 F. Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
23. 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied sub noai. Japan Line, Ltd. v.
Sabre Shipping Corp., 395 U.S. 922 (1969).
ANTITR USTJURISDICTION
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Alcoa,4
and simply held that:
[tJhe antitrust laws of this country extend to any activity (unless
plainly and clearly exempted by statute), whether carried on
by a foreigner or a citizen, which affects the trade and the com-
merce of the United States; and this is so irrespective of the citi-
zenship of the actor and the place where the activity took
place.2 5
Another view of the intent requirement was suggested in
the comprehensive discussion of extraterritorial antitrust juris-
diction principles in Japanese Electronic Products.2 6 Judge Becker
suggested that the intent required by Alcoa is a general rather
than specific intent as follows:
Judge Hand did not specify the degree of effect nor the type
of intent required. In applying the rule to the facts at hand,
however, he implied that the intent required was of a gen-
eral and not specific nature, using such words as "ex-
pected" and "supposed" to describe the [defendants'] state
of mind.27
The language that courts have used to describe the effects
required has also varied. Under the farthest-reaching formula-
tion of the effects test, any activity that has any effect at all on
United States commerce will support jurisdiction. Thus, in
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. ,28 the
Southern District of New York stated that "it is probably not
necessary for the effect on foreign commerce to be both sub-
stantial and direct as long as it is not de minimus. ' 29
Application of the effects test, in its various formulations,
has engendered much friction between the United States and
other nations. Foreign critics of the test complain that it con-
siders only the interests of the United States, without giving
any weight to the competing interests of foreign sovereigns.3 0
24. Id. at 953.
25. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
26. 494 F. Supp. at 1184.
27. Id.; see also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., Ltd., 395 F. Supp.
221, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
28. 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
29. Id. at 687.
30. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RE-
VISED) § 402 comment d & reporter's note 2 (Tent. Final Draft 1985).
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Additionally, they argue that for the United States to impose
its antitrust philosophy on foreign businesses in foreign coun-
tries on such a basis is violative of international law.
3
'
In response, many scholars advocate incorporation of the
interests of foreign states and other so-called "comity" consid-
erations into the jurisdictional analysis. In his influential 1958
treatise, for example, Kingman Brewster proposed a "jurisdic-
tional rule of reason" test which would require courts to bal-
ance a variety of factors in determining antitrust jurisdiction
over extraterritorial disputes.32
The two cases most closely associated with a jurisdictional
rule of reason approach are Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America,33 in the Ninth Circuit, and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Con-
goleum Corp. ,3" in the Third Circuit.
B. Timberlane and Mannington Mills
In Timberlane, plaintiffs were an Oregon partnership that
purchased and distributed lumber in the United States, and
two Honduran subsidiaries of the partnership, each of which
supplied lumber to the parent. Plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendants conspired to prevent them from both milling lumber
in Honduras and exporting the lumber to the United States,
thereby maintaining control of the Honduran lumber export
business. Plaintiffs contended that the alleged conspiracy af-
fected the "foreign commerce of the United States" and there-
fore was within the coverage of United States antitrust laws. 35
Judge Choy, writing for the Ninth Circuit, set forth a
three-part test for determining whether subject matter jurisdic-
tion exists over such extraterritorial activities: first, does the
alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign
commerce of the United States; second, is it of such a type and
magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the Sherman
Act; and third, whether as a matter of international comity and
fairness, should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United
31. Id.
32. K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958).
33. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (Timberlane I) remanded, 574 F. Supp. 1453
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (Timberlane II), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 3514 (1985).
34. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
35. Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 601.
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States be asserted. 6
In connection with the third prong of the analysis, Judge
Choy proposed an evaluation and balancing of a variety of fac-
tors, including:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nation-
ality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or princi-
pal places of business of corporations, the extent to which
enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve
compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United
States as compared to those elsewhere, the extent to which
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American com-
merce, the foreseeability of such an effect, and the relative
importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad.3 7
This balancing analysis integrates the rule of reason as an as-
pect of determining subject matter jurisdiction.
On remand, the district court dismissed the antitrust ac-
tion for, among other things, lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.3 8 Eight years later, the dismissal was affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit, which held:
all but two of the factors in Timberlane I's comity analysis
indicate that we should refuse to exercise jurisdiction over
this antitrust case. The potential for conflict with Hondu-
ran economic policy and commercial law is great. The ef-
fect on the foreign commerce of the United States is mini-
mal. The evidence of intent to harm American commerce is
altogether lacking. The foreseeability of the anticompeti-
tive consequences of the allegedly illegal actions is slight.
Most of the conduct that must be examined occurred
abroad. The factors that favor jurisdiction are the citizen-
ship of the parties and, to a slight extent, the enforcement
effectiveness of United States law. We do not believe that
this is enough to justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction
over this case. 3 9
In Mannington Mills, the next significant antitrust jurisdic-
tion case, a United States manufacturer of vinyl floor covering
brought an antitrust action against another United States man-
36. Id. at 615.
37. Id. at 614.
38. Timberlane 1I, 574 F. Supp. at 1455.
39. Timberlane I1, 749 F.2d at 1386 (Sneed, J.).
1986]
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ufacturer alleging that the defendant had secured foreign pat-
ents by means of fraudulent representations to various foreign
patent offices.4° In conducting the jurisdictional inquiry, the
Third Circuit looked to two questions: (1) whether subject
matter jurisdiction exists at all; and (2) whether to exercise ju-
risdiction if it does exist.4 '
The court held that the Alcoa intended effects test should
be applied to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction ex-
ists,4 2 and also held that "when two American litigants are con-
testing alleged antitrust activity abroad that results in harm to
the export business of one, a federal court does have subject
matter jurisdiction. 4 3
To determine whether to exercise jurisdiction, as a matter of
international comity, the Mannington Mills court balanced a va-
riety of factors including, in addition to those factors set forth
in Timberlane, the possible effects upon United States foreign
relations and potential conflicts ofjurisdiction.44 In contrast to
Timberlane, which used the rule of reason balancing inquiry to
analyze whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, a majority of
the Mannington Mills panel favored using these balancing fac-
tors to determine, as a discretionary matter, whether subject
matter jurisdiction, if it exists, should be exercised.45
Scholars have debated whether there is a proper jurispru-
dential basis for the jurisdictional rule of reason analysis when,
as in Mannington Mills, it is not used to determine the existence
of subject matter jurisdiction. For example, Judge Adams,
concurring in Mannington Mills, argued that courts should not
engage in a discretionary inquiry in connection with the exercise
of subject matter jurisdiction.46 In his view, once a court has
jurisdiction to hear a claim, it must exercise that power.
This position has been supported by, among others,
Atwood and Brewster:
[i]n our view, the balancing process should be an integral
part of the jurisdictional issue. This appears to have been
40. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1294.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 1291-92.
43. Id. at 1292 (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 1297-98.
45. See id. at 1297.
46. See id. at 1299.
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the Timberlane court's intent, since it viewed the balancing
element as a partial substitute for the "substantiality" and
"intent" elements generally engrafted onto the Alcoa effects
test of jurisdiction. The bulk of international scholarship
historically has treated comity as a qualification on the
scope of a state's legislative jurisdiction; and as Judge Ad-
ams observed, this classification for the balancing test
removes any question as to its doctrinal legitimacy.4 7
Although Timberlane and Mannington Mills are distinguish-
able on the foregoing grounds, they seem likely to be virtually
indistinguishable in practice and, indeed, are generally both
cited as having adopted the rule of reason test.
C. After Timberlane and Mannington Mills
Since Timberlane and Mannington Mills, other circuits have
taken differing and occasionally uncertain positions on the ex-
ercise of subject matter jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit, for ex-
ample, has generally endorsed the jurisdictional rule of reason
approach. In Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc. ,48 the Tenth
Circuit followed Timberlane in refusing to find jurisdiction over
an alleged concerted refusal of Canadian subsidiaries of Amer-
ican companies to sell Canadian potash for delivery in Canada
to a Canadian company.49 The Tenth Circuit focused, among
other things, on the facts that United States interests in pro-
tecting a Canadian company from such a concerted refusal to
deal were "minimal" and that the plaintiff had "not shown
more than a speculative and insubstantial effect on United
States commerce. '
50
The Second Circuit, for its part, has never definitively ar-
ticulated the standard it would apply to determine subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. In National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card As-
sociation,5 the Second Circuit criticized the first two prongs of
the Timberlane analysis on the ground that:
the separate identification of the first two tests may lead un-
warrantedly to an assertion of jurisdiction whenever the
challenged conduct is shown to have some effect on Ameri-
47. J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 16, at 166.
48. 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982).
49. Id. at 869-70.
50. Id.
51. 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
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can foreign commerce, even though the actionable aspect of
the restraint, the anticompetitive effect, is felt only within
the foreign market in which the injured plaintiff seeks to
compete. Building upon the fundamental 'effects' test out-
lined by Judge Learned Hand in [Alcoa], we think the inquiry
should be directed primarily toward whether the challenged restraint
has, or is intended to have, any anticompetitive effect upon United
States commerce .... 52
The Interbank court did not reach the question of whether the
third prong of the Timberlane test, the balancing inquiry, should
be recognized as an element of the subject matter jurisdic-
tional inquiry. In at least one district court case arising out of
the Second Circuit, Interbank has been read as establishing "an-
ticompetitive effects" as the Second Circuit's test of subject
matter jurisdiction.53
In a Fifth Circuit case, Industrial Investment Development Corp.
v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., a United States corporation and its two
Hong Kong subsidiaries sued a Japanese corporation and its
United States subsidiary, among others, charging a conspiracy
to keep plaintiffs out of the business of harvesting trees in In-
donesia and exporting logs and lumber products to the United
States. 55 The court identified "direct and substantial" effects
as the determinant of subject matter jurisdiction.5 6 It went on,
however, to consider the defendants' argument that the court
should not exercise jurisdiction based on the Timberlane factors
as a matter of comity and conflicts of law.57 Applying those
factors, following Mannington Mills, the court refused to grant
summary judgment to defendants based on their failure to
make the necessary showing.58
In the Uranium case,59 the Seventh Circuit considered an
allegation of price fixing in the process of reviewing a default
52. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
53. See Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G. v. Sun Co., Inc., 583 F.Supp. 1134, 1136 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1984).
54. 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 460 U.S. 1007, aff'd on
rehearing, 704 F.2d 785, cert. denied sub norn., Mitsui & Co., Ltd., v. Indus. Inv. Dev.
Corp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
55. Id. at 881.
56. Id. at 883.
57. Id. at 885.
58. See id. at 884-85.
59. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
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judgment entered against foreign corporations who had re-
fused to appear below. In analyzing the grounds for summary
judgment in the circumstance of such non-appearances, the
Seventh Circuit held it was not improper for the district court
to apply neither a Timberlane nor Mannington Mills analysis but,
instead, to simply consider three factors: (1) the complexity of
the action, which was a multi-national and multi-party action;
(2) the seriousness of the charges asserted; and (3) the recalci-
trant attitude of the defaulters. 60 However, the Seventh Cir-
cuit also found that nothing in Timberlane was inconsistent with
exercising jurisdiction in the Uranium case. The Seventh Cir-
cuit also apparently left open the possibility of using a Man-
nington Mills or Timberlane analysis in cases when the foreign
defendants participate in discovery and appear before the
court. 1
Finally, and most recently, the D.C. Circuit rejected the
notion that United States courts can or should balance compet-
ing national interests or evaluate the foreign policy implica-
tions of asserting extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction in the
Laker case.6 2 At issue was a jurisdictional conflict between
United States and British law. After Laker filed its antitrust ac-
tion against United States, British and other foreign airlines,
the foreign airlines filed suits in the High Court of Justice of
the United Kingdom to seek an injunction forbidding Laker
from prosecuting its United States antitrust action against the
foreign defendants.6 " After the High Court of Justice entered
interim injunctions against Laker, the British Court of Appeal
issued a permanent injunction ordering Laker to take action to
dismiss its United States suits against the British airlines.6 4 In
the meantime, Laker requested injunctive relief in the United
States District Court in Washington, D.C., arguing that a re-
straining order was necessary to prevent the remaining de-
fendants (all of the non-British defendants), as well as other
non-British foreign defendants Laker had named in a subse-
quent antitrust claim, from duplicating the British defendants'
60. Id. at 1255.
61. See id. at 1255.
62. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
63. Id. at 915.
64. Id.
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successful request for a British injunction.65 Underlying these
procedural events was the long-simmering conflict between
United States and British views towards United States antitrust
enforcement.
66
Judge Wilkey, writing for the D.C. Circuit, first deter-
mined that both the United States and Britain had a legitimate
basis for exercising jurisdiction, the United States by virtue of
application of the effects test (i.e., territoriality),67 and Britain
principally by virtue of nationality. 68 Judge Wilkey recognized
consideration of comity principles as legitimate, 69 but ques-
tioned the utility of an interest balancing test under the cir-
cumstances when more than one country has a basis for exer-
cising jurisdiction.7" Indeed, he specifically rejected its appli-
cation in those circumstances, at least in the absence of
guidance from the Executive Branch, arguing that it was essen-
tially a political inquiry and that courts are ill-equipped to bal-
ance national interests and determine which predominate. 7'
Instead, Judge Wilkey simply held that jurisdiction should be
exercised in Laker because of the important United States in-
terests involved. 72
In the aftermath of these cases, it is difficult to define the
present status of the case law. There has been no uniformity in
the standard applied and no predicting which approach will be
employed in what circumstances.
II. POLICY AND LEGISLA 77ON
Faced with this diversity of judicial views and the increas-
65. Id.
66. See id. at 916-21.
67. Id. at 923-26.
68. Id. at 926.
69. See id. at 937.
70. See id. at 953-55.
71. See id. at 948-55. Judge Wilkey stated:
Both nations have jurisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate. Both have as-
serted that jurisdiction. However, this conflict alone does not place the
court in a position to initiate a political compromise based on its decision
that United States laws should not be enforced when a foreign jurisdiction,
contrary to the domestic court's statutory duty, attempts to eradicate the
domestic jurisdiction. Judges are not politicians. The courts are not organs ofpolit-
ical compromise.
Id. at 953 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 955-56.
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ing internationalization of business, what non-judicial steps
have been pursued to resolve this problem? During the past
five to ten years, there have been a number of efforts to devise
a uniform standard for determining antitrust subject matter ju-
risdiction.
A. Department of Justice Guidelines
In 1977, the United States Department of Justice provided
in its Antitrust Guide for International Operations73 that "the U.S.
antitrust laws should be applied to an overseas transaction
when there is a substantial and foreseeable effect on the United
States commerce."' 7" Though the Guide also suggests that
there should be avoidance of unnecessary interference with
sovereign interests of foreign nations, to the extent consistent
with the enforcement of United States antitrust laws, 75 they are
generally viewed as having set forth a formulation of the effects
standard. (This, of course, may change when the new, revised
Guide comes out. It may reflect the "reasonableness" test
spelled out in the Reagan Administration's 1986 antitrust leg-
islation package.) 76
Use of this formulation is understandable, perhaps, when
the United States Government is enforcing the antitrust laws,
because the Government is presumably sensitive to the con-
cerns of foreign governments and will make a "foreign rela-
tions" decision before instituting a lawsuit. The Guide, how-
ever, is of no solace to foreign governments in private antitrust
actions in which plaintiffs are not required to consider foreign
government sensitivities before commencing a suit.
B. Title IV of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982
Partially in response to complaints by United States ex-
porters that the wide-ranging application of various formula-
tions of the effects test to bring extraterritorial activity under
antitrust coverage inhibited exporters' ability to compete effec-
tively in overseas markets, Congress enacted Title IV of the
73. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977).
74. Id. at 6.
75. Id. at 6-7.
76. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
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Export Trading Company Act of 1982. v7 In rather convoluted
fashion, Title IV mandates use of the direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable effects standard to determine subject matter ju-
risdiction in connection with United States export trade activi-
ties. However, Title IV seems in fact to have resulted in little
change. It does not affect current antitrust coverage of re-
straints on United States import trade. It merely removes from
antitrust scrutiny conduct that has no effect on United States
import commerce, essentially codifying the Department ofJus-
tice's enforcement policy in situations involving certain export-
related conduct.
The House Judiciary Committee Report78 contains a
number of interesting comments concerning this legislation.
First, the report makes clear that Title IV is only jurisdictional
in nature and is not intended to affect the substantive legal
standard for determining whether conduct violates the anti-
trust laws. 79 However, the report also suggests that to serve as
the predicate for antitrust jurisdiction the domestic effect must
be an anticompetitive effect prohibited by the antitrust laws.80
This provision apparently endorses the Second Circuit's In-
terbank test, discussed above. Additionally, the report notes
that courts remain free to go beyond the effects test and incor-
porate comity considerations as well.'
Only a few cases have been decided thus far under Title
IV. They do not contain any surprises. In Eurim-Pharm GmbH
v. Pfizer, Inc. ,82 a German company brought an action against
Pfizer, Inc., and a number of Pfizer's foreign subsidiaries,
claiming that the defendants had conspired to allocate foreign
markets for the antibiotic, Vibramycin. 3 The defendants
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the
ground "that the challenged activities fail to have an anticom-
petitive effect on United States domestic, import or export
commerce because the transactions underlying this action and
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (1982) (incorporating the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1982).
78. H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
79. Id. at 13.
80. Id. at 11.
81. Id. at 13.
82. 593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
83. Id. at 1104.
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the effect of these transactions occurred solely within Europe,
and the primary actors were European companies doing busi-
ness solely within Europe. "84 The court granted defendants'
motion for dismissal because the plaintiff had failed to allege
any effects at all on United States trade or commerce. 5
Another case, Liamuiga Tours v. Travel Impressions, Ltd. ,86 in-
volved, among other things, a claim by a local tour guide from
the Caribbean island of St. Kitts that the refusal of defendant, a
New York tour operator, to refer business to the plaintiff vio-
lated United States antitrust laws. The district court dismissed
this claim pursuant to Title IV, holding that the plaintiff had
failed to allege any effects other than on St. Kitts. In dictum,
the court suggested, contrary to the legislative history, that Ti-
tle IV was intended to establish "direct, substantial and rea-
sonably foreseeable effect[s]" as the sole test of antitrust sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.88
C. The Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
Currently in its seventh tentative draft, the Revised Re-
statement of Foreign Relations Law (Revised Statement) sets
forth a two-step jurisdictional rule of reason inquiry.89 Section
402 specifies the bases for determining whether jurisdiction
exists at all, providing, among other things, that "a state has
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . conduct
outside its territory which has or is intended to have substan-
tial effect within its territory .. ."90
Section 403 then specifies a balancing analysis for deter-
mining whether jurisdiction should or should not be exer-
cised.9' Specifically, section 403 provides that "a state may not
exercise jurisdiction ... when the exercise of such jurisdiction
is unreasonable." To determine whether the exercise ofjuris-
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1107.
86. 617 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
87. Id. at 924-25.
88. Id. at 925.
89. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RE-
VISED), supra note 30.
90. Id. § 402(2).
91. Id. § 403 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986).
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diction is reasonable, the Revised Restatement proposes the
evaluation of a variety of factors, including:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within
the regulating state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and fore-
seeable effects upon or in the regulating state;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or
economic activity, between the regulating state and the per-
sons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated,
or between that state and those whom the law or regulation
is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the im-
portance of the regulation to the regulating state, the extent
to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally ac-
cepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be
protected or hurt by the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of the regulation in question to the
international political, legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent
with the traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an inter-
est in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other
states.
92
Unlike Laker, section 403 also calls for balancing of foreign
interests when more than one state may have jurisdiction and
for one state "to defer to the other state if the other state's
interest is greater."
93
The Revised Restatement purports to summarize the pre-
vailing view of international law as to the proper scope ofjuris-
diction. This is a departure from the general approach embod-
ied in restatements in other areas of law which, by and large,
attempt to summarize United States case law. Whether or not
the Revised Restatement's position represents the prevailing
thinking of international jurists is debatable. Less debatable is
that to date, this position has not been accepted uniformly by
92. Id.
93. Id. § 403(3).
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United States jurists." 4 As the foregoing review of recent ma-
jor cases in this area revealed, those circuits that have ad-
dressed the question of extraterritorial application of the
United States antitrust laws are widely divergent in their ap-
proaches, and the Revised Restatement is essentially yet an-
other formulation of a rule of reason approach.
D. Recent Legislative Efforts.
Finally, what's going on on the legislative front? Early in
1985, Senator DeConcini of Arizona introduced the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1985." 5 The centerpiece
of the bill, Section 3, originally proposed that courts be re-
quired in determining whether to exercise antitrust jurisdiction
to weigh the interests of foreign nations that might be affected
against the interest of the United States in enforcement of its
antitrust laws. 96 The bill would have mandated the dismissal
of a case whenever a court determines that the interests of the
United States served by the antitrust action were outweighed
by the interests of one or more nations adversely affected by
the action.97
As explained by Senator DeConcini's statement introduc-
ing the original bill, Section 3 was "intended to codify, and
improve the operation of, the 'jurisdictional rule of reason' in
private antitrust actions involving commerce with foreign na-
tions." '98 Senator DeConcini described the provision as pro-
viding, in essence, that United States courts would not exercise
jurisdiction over antitrust actions when the interests of foreign
governments would be adversely affected and when the United
States' antitrust interest is not sufficient to justify injury to the
foreign national interest. 99
94. See e.g., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d at
953 (Wilkey, J.).
95. S. 397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S1160-62 (1985).
96. Id. § 3.
97. Id.
98. 131 Cong. Rec. S1160, 1162 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1985) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini).
99. Id. at 1161. Section 3, as originally proposed, provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the antitrust laws or any provision
of any State laws similar to the antitrust laws, in any action brought by any
person or State under the antitrust laws or similar State laws and involving
trade or commerce with a foreign nation, the court shall enter a judgment
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Senator DeConcini's original proposal was criticized by
the Reagan Administration on the ground that it would em-
broil the courts in foreign policy determinations.' 00  In re-
dismissing such action whenever it determines that the interests of the
United States served by the action are outweighed by the interests of one or
more foreign nations adversely affected by the action. Upon a request by
the court, the Attorney General shall appear to set forth the views of the
United States as to the affects of the action on the interests of the United
States and on any affected foreign nation.
Id. (emphasis added).
100. Although commending Senator DeConcini's effort to devise a solution to
the mess that exists in private antitrust cases, Charles F. Rule, then Acting Assistant
Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, nevertheless
noted in his testimony:
We do not believe S. 397's open-ended delegation to the courts of responsi-
bility for weighing the relative importance of policies and interests of our
government against those of other governments is the proper legislative re-
sponse to the foreign policy concerns arising out of private antitrust litiga-
tion ....
We believe Judge Wilkey's thoughtful opinion in the Laker litigation
correctly stated that the courts are simply the wrong place, under our Con-
stitution's allocation of responsibilities and competences, to engage in a bal-
ancing of conflicting U.S. and foreign economic policies and philoso-
phies. ...
We believe that the jurisdictional balancing test is actually composed of
three steps-the first two could generally be performed by the judiciary,
while the third should be the province of the Executive Branch. First, under
existing law a court must determine whether conduct being scrutinized has
"direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effects" on United States do-
mestic or import commerce. Only if such effects are found should the in-
quiry continue. Second, assuming the initial jurisdictional hurdle has been
cleared, the court may weigh a variety of fact-specific considerations having
no foreign relations or political overtones. They include the extent to which
enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the ex-
tent to which there is an explicit purpose to harm or affect American com-
merce, the foreseeability of such an effect, and the relative significance of
effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere. If weighing
of these factors suggests jurisdiction should not be asserted, the inquiry
ceases.
It is the third step of the balancing test that allows the courts to balance
the interests of the foreign nation against those of the U.S. and otherwise to
consider the effect of an antitrust action on foreign relations interests. It is
this potential step that the Department finds objectionable. If private treble
damage actions are to be dismissed at this stage-and we recognize that
such dismissals may be appropriate in extraordinary circumstances-we be-
lieve that it is the Executive, not the Judicial, Branch that should make that
final determination.
Generally the first two steps should resolve most jurisdictional disputes
without requiring the courts to balance political considerations. If a juris-
dictional balancing test consisted solely of these two steps and if the list of
factors to be balanced in step two were explicitly and inclusively spelled out
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sponse to this criticism, Senator DeConcini drafted a revised
version of the bill that simply calls for courts to apply a "juris-
dictional rule of reason" rather than a balancing of United
States and foreign interests. 01 Specifically, the Section 3juris-
dictional test now rests explicitly on the rule of reason, which
includes factors drawn principally from Timberlane but excludes
foreign policy issues. The proposed revision would also adopt
the suggestion of the ABA Antitrust Section to allow, rather
than require, courts to request the views of the United States
Government while affording the Government the discretion to
decide whether to actually set forth its views on a particular
case.
10 2
The bill would not be applicable to actions instituted by
United States enforcement agencies because, according to
Senator DeConcini, it is generally believed that these agencies
are already sensitive to the foreign policy implications of anti-
trust enforcement and weigh the interests of the United States
against foreign nations before challenging conduct which might
encroach on foreign sovereign interests.
to avoid any foreign relations or other political considerations, the test
might be acceptable. However, to the extent the test goes beyond well-de-
fined metes and bounds of these first two steps to consider foreign policy
factors, we believe that it is the Executive Branch that should perform this
final step.
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1985: Hearings on S.397 Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (statement of Charles
F. Rule) (emphasis added).
101. The proposed revision of Section 3 would read as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the antitrust laws or any provi-
sion of any State laws similar to the antitrust laws, in any action brought by
any person or State under the antitrust laws or similar State laws and involv-
ing trade or commerce with a foreign nation, the court shall enter a judg-
ment dismissing such action as to all parties whenever it determines that the
jurisdictional rule of reason requires such dismissal. In determining
whether to dismiss the action, the court shall consider, as appropriate and
without limitation except as provided in this Act, such factors as the relative
significance of the violation alleged to conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad, the nationality of the parties and the princi-
pal place of business of corporations, the presence or absence of a purpose
to affect United States consumers or competitors, the relative significance
and foreseeability of the effects on the United States as compared with the
effects abroad, the existence of reasonable expectations that would be fur-
thered or defeated by the action, the degree of conflict with foreign law or
foreign economic policies, and the effect of the exercise of jurisdiction on
international commerce.
102. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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Senator DeConcini's proposed bill also calls for, among
other things, expedited determination of motions to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and elimination of treble
damages when to do so would be more consistent with the ju-
risdictional rule of reason and would not substantially impair
United States antitrust enforcement efforts.
Early in 1986, the Administration released its version of
the "Foreign Antitrust Improvements Act."'' 3 Contrary to the
DeConcini bill, it contained no provision for optional de-treb-
ling, nor a provision inviting the Attorney General to provide
his views on the jurisdictional issue. The other differences
were characterized as "refinements" of the DeConcini ap-
proach. The most important is a straightforward provision
stating that a court shall dismiss actions "whenever it deter-
mines that the exercise ofjurisdiction is unreasonable" in light
of six exclusive factors set forth in the bill:
(1) the relative significance, to the violation alleged, of con-
duct within the United States as compared to conduct
abroad;
(2) the nationality of the parties and the principal place of
business of corporations;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United
States consumers or competitors;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects
of the conduct on the United States as compared with the
effects abroad;
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be
furthered or defeated by the action; and
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law. 10 4
The exclusivity of the factors was intended to foreclose an
open-ended balancing test and foreign policy judgments by
the courts, while accommodating the legitimate interests of
both the United States and foreign governments.
CONCLUSION
The law governing extraterritorial application of the
United States antitrust laws remains in a state of flux. All
103. Thurmond Introduces Administration's Antitrust Reform Legislative Package, [Vol.
50, Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1256, at 446 (March 13,
1986).
104. Id.
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branches of the Government are struggling to create a mean-
ingful and acceptable solution that accommodates the need of
the United States to ensure effective antitrust enforcement in
international situations yet gives due consideration to the com-
petition law and policy of other sovereign states. Given these
potentially conflicting objectives, it would seem sensible to
continue with a flexible approach to this problem that enables
the courts to consider all factors relevant to the exercise of ju-
risdiction. In other words, perhaps Congress would be wise to
leave the law as it stands. The current flexible approach has
not created any insurmountable problems over the years, even in
private actions where the problems can be most difficult.
